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BOOK REVIEWS
JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT. By
Gerald T. Dunne. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1970. Pp. 459.
$12.95.
This book is a compilation of a long series of studies on the life and
times of Justice Story together with many additions which appear for
the first time in this volume (p. 5 acknowledgements) giving us a
much-needed biography of Mr. Justice Story.
It is, in a sense, a parallel to Beveridge's Life of John Marshall but
written on a totally different level. It compresses the life of this com-
plicated lawyer, statesman, business man, philosopher and legal schol-
ar, whose influence on the law of the United States is more widespread
than that of Marshall, into about one-fourth the volume of Beveridge's
work. It is a lawyer's and historian's book which requires broad, de-
tailed knowledge of the contemporary discussions and political trends
for full understanding of the author's exposition. In fact, so great is
the author's intimate knowledge of the cases and of the historical and
commercial conditions of the times in which Story lived and worked
that he often becomes almost completely subjective. This makes the
book an excellent introduction to further study of the historical mate-
rial with which the author is obviously intimately acquainted, but
which a non-professional reader or even a lawyer may have difficulty
understanding.
Throughout the entire work there emerges a picture of Mr. Justice
Story's view of American national law based on the Constitution and
not on English precedents (pp. 98 ff.; pp. 129 ff.); his brief fight
against grievous conditions of the early Federal union (ch. IX); his
loyalty to stated constitutional precepts even when that involved legal-
izing slavery (pp. 240 ff.); and his broad scholarship and acquaintance
with the law and philosophy of civil law countries as well as the Eng-
lish precedents, which he decided properly to ignore when dealing with
questions of admiralty (pp. 99 ff.), bankruptcy (pp. 145-47; pp. 384
ff.: p. 403), corporations (p. 142, pp. 266 ff.) and state laws. Story's
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contribution to the development of American law through his numer-
ous treatises and his reorganization of the Harvard Law School is
brought out in a summary but forceful fashion.
Mr. Dunne touches upon the legal technicalities, the political issues
of the times, and the complicated social problems like a harpist scan-
ning his strings. This leads to interesting chords but may cast some
superficial doubt on the basic soundness of some of the conclusions to
be derived from his inferences. No place is this better illustrated than
in the author's discussion of the great Justice's philosophy on the nature
of law itself, which resulted in the decision of Swift v. Tyson' and its
subsequent overruling by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 2 This is covered
in approximately twelve pages (pp. 403-14) wherein Mr. Dunne suc-
ceeds in touching upon most of the arguments of constitutionality,
statutory interpretation and legal philosophy which have surrounded
these two cases over the last thirty years.
Swift v. Tyson, it will be recalled, was the case in which the Supreme
Court unanimously held that, under section 34 of the Judiciary Act, it
was not bound in a diversity of citizenship case arising from New York
to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of New York as to wheth-
er a pre-existing debt constituted value so as to make one a holder in
due course of negotiable paper, which decision Mr. Dunne, with tongue
in cheek, concedes is unconstitutional (pp. 403-04).
Section 34 of the Judiciary Act provided "that the laws of the several
states . . . shall be regarded as rules of decision" in such cases. The
courts of New York having decided, contrary to the Law Merchant
and most court decisions, that a pre-existing debt was not "value,"
the simple question before the court was whether or not such decisions
were "law." In other words, whether or not the doctrine of stare de-
cisis was part of the law of New York. The whole controversy sur-
rounding these cases has overlooked the constitutional provision that
judicial decisions, under article III, with the exception of equity, look
wholly to the past, and laws are regulations looking to the future.
Therefore, if courts' decisions can become "rules of law," courts are
legislating. This is impossible for the federal courts because, by arti-
cle I, section 1 of the Constitution, "all legislative power" is vested in
the Congress, so without congressional delegation no federal court can
make rules for the future.
1. 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 1 (1842).
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Insofar as the doctrine of stare decisis attempts to do this, it is not
found in the definitions of law in the Constitution of the United States.'
It is strictly an English common law anomaly based on the illogical and
unscientific argument that the law should grow from the particular
case to general rules. Thus courts, by making decisions in single cases,
can bind the future. It has been outlawed in civil law countries since
Justinian4 and was not part of the definition of law contained in the
Constitution of New York of 1821,- under which Swift v. Tyson was
decided. Story, being fully acquainted with the civil law and with the
constitutions of the United States and of New York, of course found no
difficulty in writing the opinion excluding the doctrine of stare decisis
from the definition of "laws" in section 34 of the Judiciary Act. It is
only muddle-headed, traditional thinking which has caused American
lawyers to apply the doctrine of stare decisis in discussing the implica-
tions of the term "laws" in the "rule" of Swift v. Tyson.
Mr. Warren's attempt to read stare decisis into the Judiciary Act6
is not one of his better achievements because it begs the question
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI:
This constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land....
Nowhere are court decisions or stare decisis ever mentioned. Contra, and plainly
wrong if taken out of context, see Mr. Chief Justice Warren and the whole Court,
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958): "It follows that the interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law
of the land."
4. JUSnrNUN CODE, VII-45, 13; see C. CIrv. art. 5, nn. 107-10 (Dalloz); R. POUND,
READINGS IN ROMAN LAW 11-12 (2d ed. 1914); B. WRIGHT, FRENCH CIvIL CODE 2 n.c
(1908).
5. N.Y. CONsT. art. VII, § 13 (1821) defined "law" as follows:
Such parts of the common law, and of the acts of the legislature of the
colony of New York, as together did form the law of the said colony, on the
nineteenth day of April, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, and the
resolutions of the congress of the said colony, and of the convention of the
state of New York, in force on the twentieth day of April, one thousand
seven hundred and seventy-seven, which have not since expired, or been re-
pealed, or altered; and such acts of the legislature of this state, as are now
in force, shall be and continue the law of this state, subject to such altera-
tions, as the legislature shall make concerning the same. But all such parts of
the common law, and such of the said acts, or parts thereof, as are repug-
nant to this constitution, are hereby abrogated.
That stare decisis was no "part of the common law" of New York at that time is
clearly demonstrated by Mr. Justice Story's citation of New York decisions on value,
41 U.S. (16 Peters) at 16, 17.
6. Warren, New Light on the Federal Judiciary Act, 37 HMAv. L. REv. 49, 86 ff.
(1923). Cited by Dunne at 406 n.6.
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whether court decisions are "law" by assuming that the doctrine of
stare decisis as law was in the minds of the Congress when it passed
the Judiciary Act, the very question he is attempting to prove. Only
a person obsessed with the idea that stare decisis is law could reach the
conclusion on Warren's evidence that the Congress in section 34 in-
tended to include state court decisions in the term "laws" binding on
the federal courts. The fact that the words "unwritten common law"
were stricken out by amendment equally supports an opposite infer-
ence. Stare decisis for two hundred years has dulled the wits of Anglo-
American lawyers and impeded the development of a just American
legal system. 7 Mr. Justice Brandeis's citation of Warren's article in
Erie" and his subsequent strictures on constitutionality go far beyond
anything that can be found in Warren's thesis.9 It is undoubtedly true,
as Mr. Dunne himself points out so effectively (p. 404), that as a con-
temporary, Story knew far better the meaning of section 34 of the Judi-
ciary Act than did Warren or Brandeis with their vision clouded by
modem ideas of stare decisis.
The fact that Mr. Dunne indicates this conclusion in such a sum-
mary manner without even discussing stare decisis and without even
bothering to question Mr. Justice Brandeis's abortive attempt to put
the case of Erie v. Tompkins on constitutional grounds0 is typical of
the manner in which the author cuts his way through the underbrush of
legal technicalities to reach these conclusions without even bothering
to state or discuss the premises.
It must be said that, in spite of its briefness and subjectivity, this
book gives a much needed picture of one of the greatest American le-
gal minds. Though you will not find it easy to read, it is well worth
the effort.
FREDERICK K. BEUTEL*
7. See F. BEuTrL, EXPUMEmNTAL JURISPRUDENCE 70 ff (1957).
8. 304 U.S. at 73.
9. On this point, see Mr. Justice Reed's concurring opinion rejecting stare decisis,
304 U.S. at 91, cited with approval by Dunne at 403 n.l.
10. 304 U.S. at 78 ff. The learned justice overlooks U.S. CONST. art. III, sec. 2,
pars. 1 & 2; art. I, see. 8, pars. 9 & 18, which clearly give Congress the power to create
federal courts and to prescribe their rules of law in places where they have jurisdiction,
of which this is one. Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice Reed in their opinions make
this too clear for argument. See 304 U.S. at 80.
* Visiting Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law.
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